

# Women's Careers in Economic History in the UK

Helen Julia Paul<sup>1</sup>

*University of Southampton*

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## Abstract

Economic history is an important sub-discipline of Economics.<sup>2</sup> Women in economic history face similar challenges to their female colleagues in mainstream economics. In the UK, economic history has been affected by government policies aimed at evaluating research. The Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) have been criticized for penalizing interdisciplinary work. In addition, such assessment frameworks are not likely to be gender neutral. They are a product of the existing academic elite and that elite is currently overwhelmingly male. Evidence presented using the Economic History Society Census of 2007 shows that well-established staff can fast-track their careers. The gap between them and other members of the academic community then widens. This has (unintended) consequences for gender equality at work as women tend to be clustered at lower ranks.

*Keywords:* Women's careers, Economic History, Academic labor market, Research Assessment Exercise.

JEL: A11, A12, B54,

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Women's careers in economics have been the focus of much recent research. Comparisons across countries show evidence that women are underrepresented in academic economics compared with other cognate disciplines. There is concern that this situation has not improved with time, and may be worsening in some cases. So, it is not simply a cohort effect on its own. Some have claimed that women are less able or less suited to highly quantitative subjects than men are. The most recent furor was

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<sup>1</sup> Economics Division, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. Email: hjp@soton.ac.uk.

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caused by Larry Summers when he was at Harvard University. Economic history can easily include qualitative social history, so if we accepted Summers' hypothesis we might expect women to do relatively better in economic history. Instead, evidence from the Economic History Society (EHS) 2007 census shows that in the UK, women with research interests in economic history are still underrepresented at the higher ranks. This is even when considering history departments rather than economics departments and business schools.

The UK system also grades departments on the quality of the research and funds them based on those grades. This system was called the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and will soon be replaced with another system (the Research Excellence Framework or REF). The RAEs have been criticized for creating distortions within the UK higher education community, especially with regard to hiring and promotion policies. Lower-ranked, part-time and teaching-only staff have been particularly badly affected. Women are disproportionately represented in these categories. So, there are (presumably) unintended consequences for women's careers. The RAEs have also been accused of undervaluing interdisciplinary work. If this is true, then the RAEs pose two sets of problems for women working in economic history. The design of a national system of research assessment is not necessarily neutral with regard to gender, even if it claims to be.

The RAE requires institutions to submit evidence of research outputs to subject panels.<sup>3</sup> A grade is given to each department. The RAE in 2001 used a system from 1 (low quality) to 5\* (high quality). Government funding is allocated according to grade. Interdisciplinary work does not easily fit into the panel system. Economic history could feasibly be related to at least five panels.<sup>4</sup> The RAE2001 economics and econometrics panel was to cover "all aspects of economics and econometrics, whether theoretical or applied (including, where appropriate, economic history)." The history panel was to cover "all aspects of the study of the past except those specifically falling within the remit of other panels including, for example: Political, Economic, business and Social History ..." (RAE Circular 2001). Business history was put with management under Panel 43. Despite these regulations, departments could choose which panel(s) they wished to apply to. So, economic historians were not always put forward for the economics and econometrics panel. It difficult, if not impossible, to assess economic history research using the RAE panel grades assigned to departments.

There is little concrete information *ex ante* about how a panel will judge interdisciplinary work. The RAE regulations require that panel members liaise with other panels or with outside experts to judge the quality of interdisciplinary work. There have been concerns that these steps are not sufficient to protect this type of research and consequently safeguard academic careers. Departments might prefer to hire people whose work is mainstream rather than interdisciplinary, purely due to risk aversion. As the finer details of each RAE round are not known in advance, departments make educated guesses. The effects of the RAEs on interdisciplinary researchers' careers may be substantial, but these effects have been difficult to track.

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<sup>3</sup> A maximum of four pieces of work per academic included in the submission.

<sup>4</sup> For example: economics and econometrics; business and management Studies; accounting and Finance; History; Classics, Ancient History, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies.

In the past, it has not been clear whether UK careers in economic history follow the trends of particular parent departments or form a pattern of their own. Economic historians are based in different faculties. Many research articles and policy documents separate humanities and arts from social science and business. This article uses the EHS census of 2007 to investigate the UK economic history research community. Analysis of this data provides some evidence that senior staff reap the benefits of the RAE system, even if they work in economic history. The RAE exacerbates cohort, and hence gender, effects for researchers in economic history. Membership of the EHS may ameliorate the situation for its women members. This might be due to networking or mentoring. With regard to the highest rank, only men seem to be able to charge a premium to move to certain regions of the UK. Women do not seem to do this. The premium seems to be linked to poor performance in RAE2001 by Celtic nations in particular panels. It is consistent with the hypothesis that lower-ranked departments must offer more, and use promotion, to try to buy in researchers for the next RAE round. As these established researchers tend to be male, then RAE premia widen the gap between men and women's career paths.

## II. RESEARCH INTO ACADEMIC CAREERS

There is a large body of recent research into the academic careers of female economists. Studies of the academic labor market have been undertaken for several countries. There is also a body of literature relating to the health of the economic history profession. The two research strands are not usually combined. In the UK case, there is the added complication of the RAE system which has generated an area of research of its own. (For example, Tony Brinn, Michael John Jones, and Maurice Pendlebury 2001.)

*Feminist economics* had a special issue devoted to the status of women economists in universities. Evidence from the US, the UK, Canada and China showed commonalities (Joyce P. Jacobsen 2006a). Firstly, the proportion of women amongst academic economists was lower than amongst academics in general. Secondly, women were most heavily represented at the lower rungs of the career ladder. Jacobsen argues that for the US and the UK data, this cannot be explained as a cohort effect. Women have lower probabilities of progressing to the next rank than men do (Joyce P. Jacobsen 2006b; Jonathan Burton, David H. Blackaby, Jane Humphries, and Heather Joshi 2006). There were international differences. China had a higher degree of representation of women at all ranks relative to capitalist countries. Also, there was no significant difference between Chinese men and women in responses to questions about whether the respondent had made career sacrifices due to their spouse's career (Xiaobo Wang and Xiao-Yuan Dong 2006). In Canada, women were six to eight times more likely to leave or change jobs to accommodate their spouse's career choices than men were (Roberta Edgecombe Robb 2006).

The UK evidence presented above followed from the Royal Economic Society (RES) survey of 2002. Booth and Burton presented evidence from the 1998 Survey (Alison L. Booth, Jonathan Burton, and Karen Mumford 2000). They found no statistically significant difference between the relative positions of women in post 92 and older

universities, or between departments with different RAE rankings.<sup>5</sup> Women were not heavily represented at the top ranks. Booth and Burton's findings are similar to those found by a demographic review of 2006 (David Mills, Anne Jepson, Tony Coxon, Mark Easterby-Smith, Phil Hawkins, and Jonathan Spencer 2006).

With only 22 percent of all staff being women, economics has the smallest proportion of female employees of all the social sciences [...] Only 5 percent (15 out of 295) of economics Professors are female [...] This is the lowest percentage in the social sciences and can be compared with around 25 percent female professorships in Anthropology and Sociology.

Mills *et al* found that history is also male-dominated. 70 percent of staff were male and 24 percent of staff were aged over 55 (Mills *et al* 2006: 59-60). The UK's Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) results show that, for the academic year 2007 to 2008, overall 18.7 percent of professors were female (HESA 2008).

Economic history as a sub-discipline has not received the same attention as its parent disciplines. Lists of economic historians have been compiled, such as Farnie's Bio-Bibliography of Economic and Social History (Douglas A. Farnie 2005). Articles have appeared on the state of the discipline and the future directions it should take. For example, Coleman criticized the move in the mid-twentieth century towards separate economic history departments in the UK (Donald Cuthbert Coleman 1987). (This trend has now reversed.) There are surveys of the representation of women within the economic history research community. Wrigley's survey of the *Economic History Review* showed that 13.6 percent of articles published in 1990-7 were written by women (E. A. Wrigley 1999). Subacchi's meta-analysis of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress showed that male attendees outnumbered women by four to one (Paola Subacchi 1995). These studies tend to concern the international community of economic historians rather than a particular nation. They give insights into gender issues, but are not easily comparable with work on the academic labor market which tend to focus on national case studies.

In the UK, there is also the special case of the RAE system. The RAEs have improved incentives to publish research but there have been concerns about its overall effect on the UK academic community. Elton noted that "all performance indicators distort performance". He cited the impact of the first RAEs when the number of refereed journal articles was used as a main indicator of quality. A large number of new journals were created. Researchers increased their number of publications by rehashing their work or splitting it into smaller chunks. It may also have encouraged short-termism as people rushed to publish articles. Elton has argued that the unintended consequences of the earlier RAEs were often longer-term and will be harder to fix when they do appear (Lewis Elton 2000).

Firstly, there was concern that early career staff and those who had taken career breaks were discriminated against. Some attempts have been made to correct these distortions. However, many women do take a career break of some sort, for example for maternity leave. The RAEs have changed the academic labor market as they

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<sup>5</sup>One feature of the British system is that it was previously split into universities and polytechnics. Polytechnics offered more vocational courses. This changed in 1992, as all polytechnics were renamed as universities. They are known as the new universities or post 92 institutions.

provide incentives for institutions to buy in star researchers before an RAE. These people can demand a premium. Conversely, those at lower ranks may be forced to take up the extra teaching and administration duties or to face cost-cutting measures such as short-term or part-time contracts. As women are already over-represented at these lower ranks in the UK, then the gender gap in rank, status and pay could become worse.

Secondly, the RAEs are problematic in assessing highly interdisciplinary subjects such as economic history. A report commissioned by the UK HE funding bodies found that departments and researchers widely believed that the RAE “inhibits interdisciplinary research” (Evaluation Associates 1999). Around four-fifths of the academics surveyed engaged in interdisciplinary work.<sup>6</sup> The report stated that “overall, RAE 1996 panels did not strongly discriminate for or against interdisciplinary research, although the most interdisciplinary researchers received slightly lower ratings”. The proportion of interdisciplinary research varied across fields and that there was lower interdisciplinarity for economics (31 percent). However, it is the perception, rather than the reality, of how RAEs will work that matters in the hiring market. The report noted that the most interdisciplinary researchers were affected. Some types of economic history could easily fall into this category.

The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 2006 survey did look at staff in specialist economic history units. It noted that they were ranked highly in the previous RAE (Mills *et al* 2006: 23 Table 2.5). However, it also found that many economic historians actually worked in other locations. This was confirmed by the results of the EHS census which showed that only 5 percent of the academics listed were in specialist units (Helen Julia Paul 2007). So the ESRC report did not study the effects of the RAE on the majority of economic history researchers.

Under the RAE system mainstream neoclassical economics became the only game in town (Frederic S. Lee 2007). The economics panel judged research by whether it was published in certain “core” journals. A survey undertaken in the early years of the RAE showed how this system developed (Sandra Harley and Frederic S. Lee 1997). Respondents noted that they were under pressure to move to the mainstream and to hire colleagues on the basis of their publications in these core journals. One stated, “forcing academics to publish in core journals is a form of censorship – it conditions what you say and how you say it, as well as determining areas of research and research methodologies”. Some respondents were planning to move out of the economics department into another post at the same university, purely to move under the aegis of a different RAE panel. Many job advertisements stressed publications in the journals important to the RAE economics panel. One person stated that “my own department, having got a 3 in the last RAE is in headlong pursuit of a 5, by buying in publications in core journals”.

Researchers who tailor their work to the UK system in economics might find that it did not improve their reputation elsewhere. This may hamper their opportunities in the international labor market. It is possible that a well-respected mainstream journal in economics would be happy to publish a purely cliometric article, which was not

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<sup>6</sup> They received responses from 5,832 individuals.

considered ground-breaking or even particularly convincing by other economic historians. Such an article would count towards a submission to the economics and econometrics RAE panel. This creates disincentives to be truly innovative as it means sticking to work which is familiar to mainstream economics or mainstream history. Economists are less familiar with approaches in economic history beyond pure cliometrics. Historians are not likely to have the necessary background in economic theory or quantitative methods. Yet, there is no specialist RAE panel for economic history. The subject may be judged by people who are either economists or historians, but not both. These judgments will then have effects upon the academic labor market and people's careers in academe.

### III. DATA

The data used are from the *Census of Economic historians in UK Higher Education* (Paul 2007). The data were collated from university websites in 2007 before the start of the new academic year. All university websites listed on the *Higher Education and Research Opportunities in the UK* (HERO) website were checked. All departmental or school pages relating to history, business, management and economics were used. All staff research interests on these pages were then checked. Academics employed by an HE institution and who had some listed research interest in economic, business or accounting history were included. Some were found in a variety of other departments such as geography or languages. They were located by looking at research groupings and also using the general search engine for the university. The census shows all those who expressed a research interest in economic history or related fields. This does not mean that these people consider themselves to be, first and foremost, economic historians. They may combine economic history with other work. They may label themselves as archaeologists, social historians or accountants. A list of people whose top priority was economic history would probably duplicate the EHS membership list.

The census has its limitations. As it was not a questionnaire-based study, private information was not accessible. This includes information about salary, career breaks, and any issues of personal identity such as ethnic origin. It is not known whether individuals are tenured or not, although senior lecturers and above will be tenured. There is no way of measuring individual ability or effort. A listed interest does not necessarily imply that an individual is research active. Nor does a teaching-only contract imply that an individual is research inactive. In the UK, Teaching Fellowships have replaced the title of Temporary Lecturer. They often involve a research component so the name is misleading. The job title for staff members was taken from their website. Sometimes, titles are ambiguous. For example, the rank of fellow can refer to a temporary contract or the membership of an Oxbridge college.

#### Variables

Academic ranks have been grouped into the following categories: *Rank 0*, rank unstated, ambiguous or not academic title; *Rank 1*, postdoctoral early career grades such as postdoctoral research fellowship or teaching fellowship; *Rank 2*, lecturers, both tenured and probationary; *Rank 3*, senior lecturers and readers; *Rank 4*,

professors and chairs.<sup>7</sup> Doctoral students and emeritus staff were removed from the dataset.

The census listed departmental location by region as listed in HERO, for example, south western England. The data was recoded to identify location under two different systems. The variables '*loc\*\**' refer to nations. For example, *Loc1* is England. The second system is to identify institutions within London (*Lon*), the rest of England (*roe*) and the Celtic Fringe i.e. Scotland, N. Ireland and Wales (*cf*). These systems would give rise to multicollinearity if used together. This analysis uses the second system only. London has much greater economic and political power than the rest of the UK, and the celtic nations are at the periphery.

Some new variables were created which do not appear in the original census. *EHS* was created to identify individuals who were members of the EHS. The *Institution* variable was identifies post 92 institutions. *THES* identifies membership of an institution which was listed in *The Times Higher World University Rankings 2006*. This was a timely measure of the quality of the research environment and also of the institution's ability to fund and support academic careers. There is a problem of multicollinearity with *Institution* and *THES* as all the top-ranked universities are also old universities (not former polytechnics). All dummy variables take the value of one if the researcher is a member of the category listed and zero otherwise.

The census gave information about the departmental affiliation of academics. People interested in economic history turned up in a wide variety of places including classics and archaeology, geography, economics, accounting, history and cultural studies. Very few people worked in a dedicated economic history unit. Four departmental categories were created. Anyone working in a history department or something closely related such as classics, archaeology or a museum was put into *Dept 1*. Anyone in a more quantitative subject area, including economics, management and business schools was put into *Dept 2*. Anyone working in a department with no direct connection to either of the above categories, such as geography or french, was put into *Dept 3*. Anyone who worked in a specialist economic history grouping which was not a subgroup of either *Dept1* or *Dept2* was put into *Dept4*. There are some clear groupings of economic historians, say at the University of Oxford, but the members are also clearly part of a faculty. Therefore, faculty or school level decisions will have an impact. This was particularly true in the run-up to RAE 2008.

Data relating to the RAE refers to the round in 2001. For RAE2001, Panel 38 was economics and econometrics (including where appropriate economic history). Panel 43 was business and management studies (including business history). Panel 44 was accounting and finance (RAE 2001: RAE4/01). Panel 59 was history, but in the results table it did include economic history in some instances. The London school of economics and Politics (LSE) submitted two separate units to Panel 59. One was economic history which received a grade of 5. Therefore, the panel system is extremely difficult to unravel, as economic history is only part of Panel 38 'where appropriate'. The LSE clearly felt that it was inappropriate.

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<sup>7</sup> The name of these variables is slightly different in the original census document. In addition, some individuals have been reassigned or removed when duplication or other errors were discovered. For a list of variables, see Appendix A.

Some economics departments were merged into business schools for receiving a low grade in Panel 38. Therefore, an academic working in a business school in 2007 may have survived a low grade from Panel 38 and been moved into the business school. Alternatively, he or she might have been in the business school to start with and been congratulated on helping to achieve a good grade in Panel 43. It is not safe to simply average grades between panels either. For example, City University got a grade of 3a in Panel 38 and 5 in Panel 43. Any weighted average or ‘best choice’ is meaningless. Even the subgroup of accounting historians cannot be easily assigned. The relevant RAE2001 panel should be Panel 44. Some institutions put their accountancy group in with management in general for Panel 43. RAE grades are not useful for interpreting the strength of scholarship in economic history.

#### IV ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The basic results from the census are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. Just over 40 percent of those with a research interest in economic history join the EHS. (EHS membership may be a signal of the place that economic history occupies in the academic’s own research priorities.) Unsurprisingly, most researchers are based in England, which has a far-highly population than the celtic nations combined. Women are in the minority and make up one quarter of the population overall. (For the subgroup of accounting historians, women make up one third of the group.)

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables, composition (percent) of academics, UK-based academics with research interests in Economic History, 2007 (N=611)


Member of Economic History Society	44
Female	24
Based in:	
History or related department	56
Economics or related department	29
Department not related to History or Economics	9
Specialist Economic History Center	5
Institution listed in THES 2006 list	63
Post 92 institution	17
London	14
Rest of England	68
Celtic Fringe	17
Scotland	11
Northern Ireland	2
Wales	4
Rank:	
Not known	13
Early Career	9
Lecturer (both tenured and not)	26
Senior Lecturer and Reader	18
Professor	35

*Note:* The data are from the Economic History Society 2007 Census, and the sample is restricted to current academic staff on contract (excluding Emeritus)

*Source:* EHS Census 2007



**Figure 1. Rank of UK-based Economic History researchers working in Economics or History departments**



Most researchers identified in the census are based in history departments of one type or another. Around 30 percent are in economics, management or business schools. A large majority (63 percent) are in institutions listed in the THES World Rankings 2006. Relatively few are in the new universities. It is to be expected that research-orientated institutions are more likely to appear in a census focusing on research interests. The census does not show those who have been forced to give up research or move out of academia.

The researchers based in economics or history departments and whose rank is known are shown in Figure 1. The profile shows that there are a relatively large number of male professors but a smaller number of individuals at each rank below them. There is a disparity between men and women at the top rank. That disparity appears to lessen at the lower ranks. However, this profile may indicate that the UK economic history profession has a large number of academics reaching retirement who are not being replaced. Considering that the two ranks of senior lecturer and reader are combined here, there are not many people to promote and replace the existing professors. Overall 35 percent of the researchers listed were at professorial rank. HESA statistics for 2007/08 show that for all UK academic staff, 10 percent were professors; 21 percent were senior lecturers or readers and 30 percent were lecturers (HESA 2008). This pyramid demographic is not repeated by the economic history profession which is decidedly top-heavy. However, the EHS census results show that for economic historians in history (and related) departments, 15 percent of the professors were female. For the economics (and related) departments, 18 percent of the professors were female. This is better than for mainstream economics' level of 5 percent in 1998 as quoted above.

There are relatively few academics at early career rank.<sup>8</sup> A variety of reasons may be posited for this. There may be a lessening of interest in economic history. Some early career staff have not yet published sufficiently to easily identify them from their website profiles. The lower numbers could reflect difficulties facing early career staff due to fixed-term contracts and the RAEs.

### **Academic Rank**

As the dependent variable (academic rank) is not continuous, Logistic regression has been used.<sup>9</sup> A rank can be assigned to most individuals in the EHS census (87 percent). Pay and duration of employment contract are unknown. So rank gives a broad indication of an individual's place on the career ladder. It does not allow any consideration of salary differences within a rank, which can be considerable. However, analyses of salaries come from survey responses and the census data does not. The census gives a better coverage of this group of academics than a survey would (as survey response rates tend to be less than 50 percent). So, there is a trade-off between coverage and detail. Rank is useful in the UK case due to the possible effects of the RAEs on the labor market. One of the hypotheses to be tested is that some departments are put under pressure to hire academics whose work will boost RAE grades. If the department has a low RAE rank, and hence less research funding, it might need to attract and keep certain staff members by promoting them in rank. In

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<sup>8</sup> There are no accounting historians listed at this rank in the census, for example.

<sup>9</sup> Models were run using STATA version 9. See J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese 2001.

other words, researchers who can show that their work is favored by the RAE system will have a lot of power in the labor market. Their careers will be fast-tracked and they should move up the ranks more quickly. They might accept a higher rank in exchange for moving to a low RAE grade department (which is constrained for funding). A higher grade RAE department has more power in the labor market and can resist pressure to fast-track researchers up the grades of the career ladder. It can simply buy in people at their existing grade.

Table 2. Ordered logistic regression results for academic rank, UK-based researchers in Economic History, 2007

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (β)</i>	<i>Std. error of β</i>	<i>OR [exp(β)]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Female	-0.644**	0.0187	0.525**	0.098
Based in Economics department	-0.017	0.178	0.954	0.334
<b>Type of Institution</b>				
Celtic Fringe	0.457*	0.211	1.579*	0.169
THES list 2006	-0.192	0.168	0.825	0.138
Number of cases		516		
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)		18.64 (4)**		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.01		
Akaike Information Criterion		2.571		

*Notes:* The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts and whose rank is known.  
\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$   
*Source:* EHS Census 2007

For the researchers whose rank is known, the results of an ordered logistic regression with rank as the dependent variable are shown in Table 2. Being based in an economics department or a highly-ranked research institution does not have a statistically significant effect upon rank. If the researcher is based in a celtic institution, then there seems to be a statistically significant effect ( $p < 0.05$ ). This is positive and implies that *ceteris paribus* locating to the Celtic Fringe has a positive effect on career progression. The model implies that researchers in celtic universities had 1.6 times the odds of reaching a particular academic rank rather than a lower one, than their counterparts in England ( $p < 0.05$ ).

These results are unexpected. The RAE system might be expected to speed up career progression within research-focused universities as they competed to attract those with the right publication record. Taking this result alone, it may be that economic history work is less valuable in the RAE hiring frenzy, for reasons which have been discussed above. However, economics departments have a clear preference for researchers whose work is published as journal articles rather than books. This is

because the economics panels in the RAEs do not value books highly, whilst humanities panels do. So, it might be expected that being in an economics department would have an appreciable negative effect upon rank. No such result appears here. Economic historians may have managed to publish in mainstream journals, or perhaps they have simply already left economics departments. However, at first glance, there seems little reason why there should be any effect of location upon rank. All UK institutions face the RAE system. The celtic countries have plenty of research-orientated institutions which compete in the international labor market.

The gender effect upon rank was expected and is consistent with work done elsewhere on women's academic careers. There is a statistically significant negative relationship between being female and moving up the career ladder. Men have twice the odds of reaching a particular rank (rather than the ones below it) than women do ( $p < 0.01$ ).<sup>10</sup>

Table 3. Ordered logit regression results for academic rank, UK academics with research interests in Economic History based in History departments, 2007

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (β)</i>	<i>Std. error of β</i>	<i>OR [exp(β)]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Female	-0.698**	0.249	0.497**	0.124
<b>Type of Institution</b>				
Celtic Fringe	0.026	0.281	1.026	0.289
THES list 2006	-0.200	0.219	0.980	0.214
<hr/>				
Number of cases	292			
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)	7.93 (3)*			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.01			
Akaike Information Criterion	2.567			

*Notes:* The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts, based in History and related subject departments and whose rank is known.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

Source: EHS Census 2007

Further investigation of these results involved splitting the dataset into smaller segments. Academics based in history departments are the largest group (N = 292). The results of the ordered logistic regression on rank are shown in Table 3. In this group, the Celtic Fringe coefficient is no longer statistically significant. The coefficient for gender is ( $p < 0.01$ ) and it still implies a negative relationship between

<sup>10</sup> The coefficient for Female is negative and the Odds Ratio is 0.525. The Odds Ratio is simply the exponential of the beta (-0.644). It is difficult to express the result clearly as it stands. If the dummy variable coding was reversed so that Male took the value of 1 and Female of 0, the beta should be 0.644. Exp(beta) now becomes 1.90 or close to 2. This makes the result easier to explain in words. The same procedure has been repeated wherever there is a similar case.

being female and career progression. The odds have not changed much with men still having twice the odds of reaching a particular rank than their female counterparts ( $p < 0.01$ ). Table 4 shows the results for the economics group. The gender effect is still significant and echoes the results for historians ( $p < 0.05$ ). So, these results do not show that women find it easier to climb the career ladder in history departments. Larry Summers' notion that women struggle with quantitative subjects would imply that women will find it easier to progress in humanities. The results shown here show no such safe haven. Nor does it appear outside options in the labor market have much effect on women's careers. Economists may have lucrative outside options, but historians do not tend to. Yet, in this instance, academic women seem to have similar challenges in advancement across all departments.

Table 4. Ordered logit regression results for academic rank, UK academics with research interests in Economic History based in Economics departments, 2007

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (<math>\beta</math>)</i>	<i>Std. error of <math>\beta</math></i>	<i>OR [<math>\exp(\beta)</math>]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Female	-0.727*	0.339	0.483*	0.164
<b>Type of Institution</b>				
THES list 2006	-0.400	0.310	0.670	0.208
<b>Location of Institution</b>				
Celtic Fringe	0.998**	0.369	2.714**	1.001
Number of cases		153		
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)		15.41 (3)**		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.04		
Akaike Information Criterion		2.53		

Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts and based in Economics and related subject departments, and whose rank is known.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

Source: EHS Census 2007

For the economists, the coefficient for the Celtic Fringe institutions is statistically significant and has a positive effect on rank ( $p < 0.01$ ). The odds of a researcher in a celtic institution reaching a particular rank are almost 3 times that a researcher based in England ( $p < 0.01$ ). To consider gender and location effects separately, the group was split into male-only and female-only. If the Celtic Fringe effect is related to the RAE, it might be expected that an RAE labor market premium will be most obvious at the higher ranks. These ranks tend to contain the established researchers whose publication record in 'core' journals counts towards RAE grades. So a logistic regression with professorial rank as the dependent variable was used. Using the female-only dataset did not yield a model which was statistically significant from the intercept model. This may be because the size of the subgroup was small ( $N = 42$ ) or it may be that the location effect does not apply to the female labor market. The results for the male-only dataset are in Table 5. The Celtic Fringe premium is clearly

apparent. Now, the odds for a male researcher in a celtic university of reaching a particular rank rise to 3.11 times that of a male researcher in England ( $p < 0.05$ ). The coefficient for being in a THES 2006 institution is not statistically significant.

Table 5. Logit regression results for professorial rank, UK-based male academics with research interests in Economic History based in Economics departments, 2007

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (<math>\beta</math>)</i>	<i>Std. error of <math>\beta</math></i>	<i>OR [<math>\exp(\beta)</math>]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Intercept	-0.217	0.324	NA	NA
<b>Type of Institution</b>				
THES 2006 ranked	-0.48	0.401	0.619	0.248
<b>Location of Institution</b>				
Celtic Fringe	1.133*	0.455	3.11*	1.414
Number of cases	111			
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)	8.12(2)*			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.05			
Akaike Information Criterion	1.357			

restricted to all male academic staff at the top professorial rank who are based in Economics and related subject departments.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

Source: EHS Census 2007

The premium for moving to the Celtic Fringe seems stronger at the highest rank. This is consistent with theories that RAE-based incentives have allowed well-established researchers to demand a premium. This premium seems to be concerned with economics-type departments and not history ones. Again, this points to the RAE as being part of the cause, as departmental-level activities are related to the RAE panel system. If the premium was something to do with the institutions themselves or national policies, then we would expect to see the same premium appearing amongst history staff.

The effect could be due to inertia with celtic institutions retaining their older highly-ranked staff in economics and business schools. However, as all UK institutions face RAE pressures this is unlikely. The RAE effect on hiring to 'buy in publications' has been discussed above. A more convincing explanation is that celtic countries are at a relative disadvantage in the hiring market for economists. They are forced to offer a premium to retain staff and to attract new hires. This would imply that there was some sort of relative disadvantage for academics to move to Wales, Scotland and N. Ireland. These countries have lower population density overall, although Scotland's central belt is an exception to this rule. It is relatively more difficult for a spouse to find employment in areas of low population or high unemployment. For certain jobs, such as finance, there are far more opportunities in south east England than there would be in Northern Ireland. Scotland's silicon glen and Edinburgh's financial sector are exceptions.

So for a premium to occur firstly there must be some sort of hurdle involved in moving. Secondly, the researcher must be able to demand that the premium is paid. Male economists seem to ask for, and get, such a premium. Historians do not. It is not clear what is happening for female economists as there are relatively few of them. Economists may be able to demand a premium due to more lucrative outside options than historians. Or, it may be partly due to the RAE gradings given to economics and business schools in the Celtic nations. If they have low grades, then it is less attractive to move to the periphery.

Five celtic institutions make it into the THES 2006 ranking (Times Higher Education Supplement 2006). There are some well-regarded economics departments and business schools in the celtic countries. However, the RAE rankings for 2001 are interesting (RAE Outcome 2001). Panel 59 (history) ranks seven non-English institutions as 5 or 5\*.<sup>11</sup> Panel 38 (economics and econometrics) has none. Panel 43 (management) only has one (in Wales). These rankings determine how much research money flows from central government to each department. A low-ranked department may be desperate to hold on to any star researchers it does have and encourage new ones to join. If funds are more restricted, promoting someone at any earlier stage in their career may be cheaper than hiring in an expensive established professor. So, if the celtic nations fail to gain high grades in certain panels, they may have responded by buying in researchers and promoting them.

Twenty-five people in the EHS census were accounting historians who are in accounting departments which submitted to Panel 44. Six celtic institutions gained at 5 or 5\* in this panel. Therefore, removing these twenty-five individuals should result in a stronger celtic premium effect if the RAE hypothesis is correct. For male researchers in departments submitting to panel 38 or 43, a further logistic regression was run with professorial rank as the dependent variable. The results of a logistic regression for professorial rank are given in Table 6. The Akaike Information Criterion is lower (1.349 as opposed to 1.357) which implies that the model without Panel 44 data is a better fit. The celtic premium is statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) and the odds of a male researcher based in the celtic nations being at professorial rank are now four times that of a male researcher based in England. Removing those people whose departments targeted Panel 44 (RAE2001) where the celtic nations did well, shows that the celtic premium strengthens. In other words, when we consider that celtic nations did badly in the RAE2001 in panels 38 and 43, it is perhaps not surprising that they may have had to pay a job market premium in terms of career progression. There may be advantages and disadvantages in moving to the periphery, but the Celtic Fringe premium seems to be related to RAE grades in specific panels.

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<sup>11</sup> Other history-related panels also have 5 or 5\* grades for Celtic institutions. Panel 57 (Classics, Ancient History etc.) has one 5 and Panel 58 (Archaeology) has two.

Table 6. Logistic regression results for Professorial rank, UK-based male academics researching in Economic History based in departments which submitted to Panel 38 (Economics) or 43 (Management) in RAE2001, 2007.

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (β)</i>	<i>Std. error of β</i>	<i>OR [exp(β)]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Intercept	-0.53	0.375	NA	NA
<b>Type of Institution</b>				
THES 2006 ranked	-0.092	0.451	0.912	0.411
<b>Location of Institution</b>				
Celtic Fringe	1.413**	0.517	4.110**	2.216
Number of cases	93			
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)	8.15(2)*			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.06			
Akaike Information Criterion	1.349			

*Notes* : The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is restricted to male academic staff currently employed on contracts, based in departments which submitted to Panels 38 or 43 of RAE2001.

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01

*Source* : EHS Census 2007

If this is so, then only certain researchers can take advantage of this premium. Other studies seem to suggest that people have to publish in mainstream journals to be of interest to departments targeting the economics panel of the RAE. So, Economic historians might have to be well-established in order to have some papers which would suit. Or else, they may move out of economics altogether. This may partly explain why many researchers are based in history departments. For those who remain in economics, there seems to be evidence that the RAE does create bonuses for those people who are already part of the elite. That is, researchers who are well-established and at the top rank of the profession. Notably, these people tend to be male. Whether or not this was a cohort effect before the RAEs, it is not likely to be after them. For in economics, the elite and mainstream replicates itself. This has severe consequences for interdisciplinary subjects such as economic history. It also widens any gap between the top rank and the lower ranks of the profession. So, even if women were beginning to move into the top ranks, they may see their gains being slowed or even reversed. As the RAE-induced labor market becomes more restricted, it makes even more sense not to hire women in case they take maternity leave for example. Naturally, no one is going to admit that in a survey. The RAE system itself is so obtuse that it can hide a multitude of sins.



Table 7. Logistic regression results for membership of the Economic History Society, UK-based academics with research interests in Economic History, 2007.

	<i>Log. (relative odds)</i>		<i>Odds ratio</i>	
	<i>Coeff. (β)</i>	<i>Std. error of β</i>	<i>OR [exp(β)]</i>	<i>Std. error for OR</i>
Intercept	0.114	0.162	NA	NA
Female	-0.412*	0.2	0.663*	0.133
<b>Type of department</b>				
Economics (broadly-defined)	-0.949**	0.195	0.387**	0.076
<b>Type of institution</b>				
THES 2006 list	-0.56	0.175	0.942	0.164
Celtic Fringe	0.104	0.223	1.11	0.248
Number of cases	611			
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)	29.78(4)**			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.04			
Akaike Information Criterion	1.337			

*Notes* : The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

*Source* : EHS Census 2007

With regard to the EHS membership only, a number of different ordered logistic regression were run with rank as the dependent variable. Also, a number of logit regressions were run with professorial rank as the dependent variable. None of the models was statistically significant from the intercept model. So, there is no evidence of a gender effect on rank within the EHS membership. This might imply that women are less likely to join the EHS than men are. It may also signify that membership of such an academic society helps women in their careers, perhaps through mentoring, networking or other types of support. In order to investigate these issues further, a logistic regression was run using EHS membership as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 7. The coefficients for the Celtic Fringe and THES2006 are not statistically significant. So, there is no evidence that the society's membership is concentrated in highly ranked institutions (by the THES ranking) or in England. However, the coefficients for 'female' and 'economics departments' (broadly-defined) are statistically significant and also negative. This implies that women and those in economics, management or business departments are less likely to join the society. Men have 1.5 times the odds of joining the EHS than women do ( $p < 0.05$ ). Those outside of the economics and management departments had 2.6 times the odds of joining the society than researchers based inside those departments ( $p < 0.01$ ).

It is a reasonable assumption that membership of the EHS is a good signal that Economic history is likely to be the main focus of the academic's research profile. The society is the main academic society for the subject; is well-funded; maintains an annual conference, and has specialist committees including a women's committee. So, if women and those in economics departments are under-represented, it may be a sign

that the economic historians are moving out of economics departments and that women are leaving the discipline. These results would be consistent with work already undertaken on the RAEs and the UK academic labor market.

## CONCLUSIONS

Women's careers in academic economics seem to lag behind men in a number of countries. In the UK case, the RAE system may hamper them further. The RAEs burden those at lower ranks; who are part-time or untenured or who have had career breaks. In the UK, as elsewhere, women are relatively more likely to be in these vulnerable categories. Another problem facing UK economic historians are the RAEs' effects on interdisciplinary research and careers. When an academic is both female and an economic historian it might be expected that the problems are compounded. As the RAE systems are highly subjective and the grading methods are not made transparent *ex ante*, there is a strong suspicion that they favor the entrenched elite. The UK elite is disproportionately male. Economic History Society membership may ameliorate some of the problems for women, perhaps due to networking effects. However, women seem less likely to join the society in the first place than men are.

If the RAEs have increased pressures on the lower ranks, they have provided a boost to the careers of established academics. Women are not heavily represented at these ranks. Interestingly, there is evidence of how the RAE system allows some academics to demand a premium. In this study, it is visible as a premium in rank for moving to areas with low RAE scores, i.e. a celtic premium. The effect is noticeable amongst the economics family of departments, but not for history. The celtic nations may be at a disadvantage to England, perhaps due to employment opportunities for spouses. However, any such drawbacks apply to the whole institution or region and do not vary with the type of department. A departmental-level effect is more likely to be due to the RAE than any other cause. No celtic institution received a 5 or 5\* in RAE2001 for economics or management, except for Cardiff University. Low performers in the RAE may be under greater pressure to fast-track researchers to professorial rank, in order to compete in the RAE-based labor market.

The RAE system boosts certain sections of the academic community at the expense of others, simply because of their place in the career cycle. This means that there is a persistence of the gender gap, even though women are entering academia in greater numbers. So, the RAE systems seem to be widening that gap as they allow top-ranked men to demand premia. Although the system has undergone reforms and will be replaced shortly, the evidence presented here shows that there is no Whig history of constant progress for women's careers. National policies can distort the labor market in particular countries and undermine the gains which women have made. Larry Summers' belief that women were less suited to quantitative work certainly does not explain why they were underrepresented at the top ranks in history schools. It also does not explain why they were well represented amongst accounting historians. However, his comments should enlighten us about the importance of discriminatory attitudes amongst the academic elite. They are the people who are called upon to devise systems such as the Research Assessment Exercises.

## APPENDIX

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Dummy variable equals 1 if condition is met, 0 otherwise</i>
<i>Female</i>	Academic is female
<i>EHS</i>	Academic is a member of the Economic history Society
<i>THES</i>	Institution is in Times Higher World University Rankings 2006
<i>Institution</i>	Institution is a post 92 institution (former Polytechnic)
<i>Lon</i>	Institution is in London
<i>Roe</i>	Institution is in England but not in London
<i>Cf</i>	Institution is in Wales, Scotland or N. Ireland
<i>Loc1</i>	Institution is in England
<i>Loc2</i>	Institution is in Scotland
<i>Loc3</i>	Institution is in N. Ireland
<i>Loc4</i>	Institution is in Wales
<i>Dept1</i>	Academic is in a History department (broadly defined)
<i>Dept2</i>	Academic is in an economics department (broadly defined)
<i>Dept3</i>	Academic is in a department not related to Depts. 1 and 2
<i>Dept4</i>	Academic is in a special Economic history center
<i>Rank1</i>	Academic is early career
<i>Rank2</i>	Academic is a lecturer
<i>Rank3</i>	Academic is a senior lecturer or reader
<i>Rank4</i>	Academic is a professor

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